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Full Idea
Teleosemantic theories usually give a causal account of mental functions …where some trait has a particular function if it was selected for that function by a process of natural selection.
Gist of Idea
Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions
Source
Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 4.4)
Book Ref
Schulte,Peter: 'Mental Content' [CUP 2023], p.34
A Reaction
This is an idea I like - that something has a specific function if without that function it wouldn't have come into existence (eyes, for example). But presumably the function of a mind is to collect content - which does nothing to explain content!
| 23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
| 23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
| 23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
| 23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
| 23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
| 23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
| 23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
| 23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
| 23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
| 23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
| 23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
| 23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |