more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 2386
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
]
Full Idea
The Hard Problem is: why is all this brain processing accompanied by an experienced inner life?
Gist of Idea
Hard Problem: why brains experience things
Source
David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], Intro)
Book Ref
Chalmers,David J.: 'The Conscious Mind' [OUP 1997], p.-7
A Reaction
The word 'accompanied' is interesting. A very epiphenomenal word! The answer to this neo-dualist question may be: if you do enough complex representational brain processing at high speed, it adds up to some which we call 'experience'.
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[what causes minds to be conscious]:
|
23665
|
Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers
[Reid]
|
|
20118
|
Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness
[Nietzsche]
|
|
9286
|
Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences
[James]
|
|
7394
|
Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events
[Dennett]
|
|
7890
|
Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way
[Papineau]
|
|
4921
|
Quantum states in microtubules could bind brain activity to produce consciousness
[Penrose]
|
|
3141
|
Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex?
[Rey]
|
|
4092
|
The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question
[Crane]
|
|
2386
|
Hard Problem: why brains experience things
[Chalmers]
|
|
2416
|
What turns awareness into consciousness?
[Chalmers]
|
|
2423
|
Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish?
[Chalmers]
|
|
4916
|
There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain
[Carter,R]
|
|
4930
|
Consciousness arises from high speed interactions between clusters of neurons
[Edelman/Tononi]
|
|
9312
|
Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented
[Kriegel/Williford]
|
|
9313
|
Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness
[Kriegel/Williford]
|
|
9315
|
Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself
[Kriegel/Williford]
|
|
9316
|
How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that?
[Kriegel/Williford]
|
|
23516
|
Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts
[Seth]
|