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Single Idea 24010
[filed under theme 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
]
Full Idea
One's conception of an admirable human being implies that he should be disposed to certain kinds of emotional response, and not to others.
Gist of Idea
An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses
Source
Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.225)
Book Ref
Williams,Bernard: 'Problems of the Self: Papers 1956-1972' [CUP 1979], p.225
A Reaction
So are the good emotions an indicator of being a good person, or is that what their goodness consists of? The goodness must be cashed out in actions, and presumably good emotions both promise good actions, and motivate them.
Related Idea
Idea 24011
Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B]
The
65 ideas
from Bernard Williams
22454
|
We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order)
[Williams,B, by Foot]
|
22407
|
Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity
[Williams,B]
|
22410
|
Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd
[Williams,B]
|
22408
|
Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared
[Williams,B]
|
22411
|
For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one
[Williams,B]
|
22409
|
We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty
[Williams,B]
|
4113
|
'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty'
[Williams,B]
|
4110
|
Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future
[Williams,B]
|
4112
|
A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires
[Williams,B]
|
4114
|
Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple
[Williams,B]
|
4116
|
A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power
[Williams,B]
|
4121
|
Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws?
[Williams,B]
|
4122
|
If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests
[Williams,B]
|
4120
|
It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act
[Williams,B]
|
4124
|
Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law
[Williams,B]
|
4131
|
Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character
[Williams,B]
|
4133
|
Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one
[Williams,B]
|
4132
|
The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees
[Williams,B]
|
4128
|
Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting
[Williams,B]
|
4134
|
The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels"
[Williams,B]
|
4135
|
Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values
[Williams,B]
|
4243
|
Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries
[Williams,B]
|
4244
|
It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism
[Williams,B]
|
4247
|
It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children
[Williams,B]
|
4245
|
Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions
[Williams,B]
|
4246
|
Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide
[Williams,B]
|
4252
|
Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked
[Williams,B]
|
4249
|
"Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation
[Williams,B]
|
4248
|
Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done
[Williams,B]
|
4250
|
The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent
[Williams,B]
|
22355
|
In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible
[Williams,B]
|
22453
|
Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts
[Williams,B, by Foot]
|
22455
|
Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon
[Williams,B]
|
20168
|
Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified
[Williams,B]
|
20167
|
Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations
[Williams,B]
|
3233
|
Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs
[Williams,B]
|
3234
|
Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view
[Williams,B]
|
3235
|
It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight
[Williams,B]
|
3236
|
Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society
[Williams,B]
|
9284
|
Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise
[Williams,B]
|
23282
|
If all that matters in morality is motive and intention, that makes moral luck irrelevant
[Williams,B]
|
24007
|
Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions
[Williams,B]
|
24008
|
Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions
[Williams,B]
|
24009
|
Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things
[Williams,B]
|
24010
|
An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses
[Williams,B]
|
24012
|
Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness
[Williams,B]
|
23278
|
For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them
[Williams,B]
|
23279
|
It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves'
[Williams,B]
|
23280
|
Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character
[Williams,B]
|
7946
|
The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things
[Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
|
3238
|
'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague
[Williams,B]
|
3239
|
You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type
[Williams,B]
|
23283
|
Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first
[Williams,B]
|
4317
|
We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded
[Williams,B, by Cottingham]
|
2169
|
Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status
[Williams,B]
|
2172
|
The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece
[Williams,B]
|
2174
|
Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event
[Williams,B]
|
2176
|
There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened
[Williams,B]
|
2175
|
There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good
[Williams,B]
|
2180
|
If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice
[Williams,B]
|
2178
|
In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent
[Williams,B]
|
2179
|
If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives
[Williams,B]
|
2181
|
It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide
[Williams,B]
|
22450
|
If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true
[Williams,B, by Foot]
|
4366
|
We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific
[Williams,B, by Hursthouse]
|