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Single Idea 2404
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
]
Full Idea
It is consistent with the physical facts about a mouse that it has conscious experiences, and it is consistent with the physical facts that it does not.
Gist of Idea
Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious
Source
David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 2.3.1.4)
Book Ref
Chalmers,David J.: 'The Conscious Mind' [OUP 1997], p.103
A Reaction
No. It is consistent with our KNOWLEDGE of a mouse that it may or may not be conscious. I take this to be the key error of Chalmers, which led him to the mistaken idea that zombies are possible. The usual confusion of ontology and epistemology….
The
52 ideas
from 'The Conscious Mind'
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14708
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Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility
[Chalmers, by Schroeter]
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9318
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Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation
[Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
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2386
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Hard Problem: why brains experience things
[Chalmers]
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2389
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Sometimes we don't notice our pains
[Chalmers]
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2390
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We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour
[Chalmers]
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2391
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Can we be aware but not conscious?
[Chalmers]
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2392
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Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other
[Chalmers]
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2393
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Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set
[Chalmers]
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2394
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Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set
[Chalmers]
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2395
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Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience
[Chalmers]
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2397
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'Perception' means either an action or a mental state
[Chalmers]
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2396
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Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation
[Chalmers]
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2398
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Reduction requires logical supervenience
[Chalmers]
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13956
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Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity
[Chalmers]
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13963
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Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind
[Chalmers]
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13960
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In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning
[Chalmers]
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13958
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The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference
[Chalmers]
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2399
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Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O")
[Chalmers]
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13959
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The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world
[Chalmers]
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13957
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Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning
[Chalmers]
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13961
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We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds
[Chalmers]
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13962
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Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement
[Chalmers]
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2401
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All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me
[Chalmers]
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18403
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Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it
[Chalmers]
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2400
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Is intentionality just causal connections?
[Chalmers]
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16048
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Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same
[Chalmers, by Bennett,K]
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2402
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It seems possible to invert qualia
[Chalmers]
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2403
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Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness
[Chalmers]
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2404
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Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious
[Chalmers]
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2405
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Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base
[Chalmers]
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2406
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H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that
[Chalmers]
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2407
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One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star)
[Chalmers]
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16424
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Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity
[Chalmers]
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16425
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Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities
[Chalmers]
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16426
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How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world
[Chalmers]
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16427
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Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible
[Chalmers]
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2409
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Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level?
[Chalmers]
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2411
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Supervenience makes interaction laws possible
[Chalmers]
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2413
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If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness
[Chalmers]
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2412
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Can we explain behaviour without consciousness?
[Chalmers]
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2414
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When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences
[Chalmers]
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2415
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In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing
[Chalmers]
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2416
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What turns awareness into consciousness?
[Chalmers]
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2417
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Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation?
[Chalmers]
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2418
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The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside
[Chalmers]
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2419
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Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement?
[Chalmers]
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2422
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The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it
[Chalmers]
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2423
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Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish?
[Chalmers]
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2424
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It is odd if experience is a very recent development
[Chalmers]
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2426
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Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained?
[Chalmers]
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2428
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Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't
[Chalmers]
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2429
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Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable
[Chalmers]
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