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Single Idea 24105

[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act ]

Full Idea

'Drive' is only a translation from the language of nonfeeling into the language of feeling. 'Will' is what is communicated to our feelings as a result of that process - in other words an effect, and not the beginning and cause.

Gist of Idea

Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings

Source

Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 7[025])

Book Ref

Nietzsche,Friedrich: 'The Joyful Science, and 1881-82 fragments (v 6)', ed/tr. Del Caro,Adrian [Stanford 2023], p.224

A Reaction

This shows the link between his central idea of 'drives' in psychology, and the actions that result. Effectively this makes all our actions arise from the unconscious. Intention and choice are effectively epiphenomena.

Related Idea

Idea 23191 Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts [Nietzsche]

The 33 ideas with the same theme [mental initiation of an action]:

2171 The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B]
8230 Just as you have the impulse to do something, stop [Anon (Cent)]
23316 For Plato and Aristotle there is no will; there is only rational desire for what is seen as good [Plato, by Frede,M]
23320 Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
23323 Earlier Stoics speak of assent, but not of choice, let alone of a will [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
22118 Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews]
1846 The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas]
1847 The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas]
1857 We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas]
23180 The will is the rational appetite [Aquinas]
4309 Spinoza argues that in reality the will and the intellect are 'one and the same' [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
4838 Claiming that actions depend on the will is meaningless; no one knows what the will is [Spinoza]
12946 The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz]
19331 Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz]
2220 Only experience teaches us about our wills [Hume]
6183 Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant? [Kant]
6191 The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles [Kant]
23233 The will is awareness of one of our inner natural forces [Fichte]
22769 The concept of the will is the free will which wills its freedom [Hegel]
21924 As the subject of willing I am wretched, but absorption in knowledge is bliss [Schopenhauer]
7187 Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer]
21365 Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer]
3772 The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill]
24105 Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings [Nietzsche]
18313 The big error is to think the will is a faculty producing effects; in fact, it is just a word [Nietzsche]
4554 The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding [Nietzsche]
18299 The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche]
9265 The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
23336 There is no will for Plato or Aristotle, because actions come directly from perception of what is good [Frede,M]
7861 Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
6660 Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
6661 Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe]
23517 Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth]