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Full Idea
The explanation of my zombie twin's claims does not depend on consciousness, as there is none in his world. It follows that the explanation of my claims is also independent of the existence of consciousness.
Gist of Idea
If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness
Source
David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 2.5.2)
Book Ref
Chalmers,David J.: 'The Conscious Mind' [OUP 1997], p.180
A Reaction
Epiphenomenalism says my accounts of my consciousness are NOT because of my consciousness (which seems daft). Chalmers here gives a very good reason why we should not be a friend of philosophical zombies.
| 12727 | It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz] |
| 9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
| 4967 | It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke] |
| 3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
| 3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
| 3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
| 3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
| 2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
| 7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
| 7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |