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Single Idea 2416
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
]
Full Idea
Given the necessity of awareness, any candidate for an underlying law will have the form "Awareness plus something gives rise to consciousness" (…but simplicity suggests leaving out the 'something').
Gist of Idea
What turns awareness into consciousness?
Source
David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 3.6.5)
Book Ref
Chalmers,David J.: 'The Conscious Mind' [OUP 1997], p.244
A Reaction
You can't leave out the 'something' if you think awareness without consciousness is possible. The phenomenon of blindsight suggests that a whole extra brain area must come into play to produce the consciousness. It may not have a distinct ontology.
The
57 ideas
from David J.Chalmers
16473
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Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths
[Chalmers, by Stalnaker]
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19258
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Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world
[Chalmers, by Vaidya]
|
14708
|
Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility
[Chalmers, by Schroeter]
|
9318
|
Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation
[Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
|
2386
|
Hard Problem: why brains experience things
[Chalmers]
|
2389
|
Sometimes we don't notice our pains
[Chalmers]
|
2390
|
We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour
[Chalmers]
|
2391
|
Can we be aware but not conscious?
[Chalmers]
|
2392
|
Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other
[Chalmers]
|
2393
|
Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set
[Chalmers]
|
2394
|
Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set
[Chalmers]
|
2395
|
Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience
[Chalmers]
|
2397
|
'Perception' means either an action or a mental state
[Chalmers]
|
2396
|
Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation
[Chalmers]
|
2398
|
Reduction requires logical supervenience
[Chalmers]
|
13960
|
In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning
[Chalmers]
|
13956
|
Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity
[Chalmers]
|
13963
|
Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind
[Chalmers]
|
13962
|
Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement
[Chalmers]
|
13958
|
The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference
[Chalmers]
|
2399
|
Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O")
[Chalmers]
|
13959
|
The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world
[Chalmers]
|
13957
|
Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning
[Chalmers]
|
13961
|
We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds
[Chalmers]
|
2400
|
Is intentionality just causal connections?
[Chalmers]
|
2401
|
All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me
[Chalmers]
|
18403
|
Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it
[Chalmers]
|
16048
|
Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same
[Chalmers, by Bennett,K]
|
2402
|
It seems possible to invert qualia
[Chalmers]
|
2403
|
Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness
[Chalmers]
|
2404
|
Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious
[Chalmers]
|
2405
|
Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base
[Chalmers]
|
2406
|
H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that
[Chalmers]
|
2407
|
One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star)
[Chalmers]
|
16424
|
Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity
[Chalmers]
|
16425
|
Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities
[Chalmers]
|
16426
|
How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world
[Chalmers]
|
16427
|
Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible
[Chalmers]
|
2409
|
Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level?
[Chalmers]
|
2411
|
Supervenience makes interaction laws possible
[Chalmers]
|
2413
|
If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness
[Chalmers]
|
2412
|
Can we explain behaviour without consciousness?
[Chalmers]
|
2414
|
When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences
[Chalmers]
|
2415
|
In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing
[Chalmers]
|
2416
|
What turns awareness into consciousness?
[Chalmers]
|
2417
|
Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation?
[Chalmers]
|
2418
|
The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside
[Chalmers]
|
2419
|
Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement?
[Chalmers]
|
2422
|
The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it
[Chalmers]
|
2423
|
Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish?
[Chalmers]
|
2424
|
It is odd if experience is a very recent development
[Chalmers]
|
2426
|
Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained?
[Chalmers]
|
2428
|
Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't
[Chalmers]
|
2429
|
Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable
[Chalmers]
|
14712
|
A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false
[Chalmers]
|
14713
|
Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent
[Chalmers]
|
14739
|
'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds
[Chalmers, by Sider]
|