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Single Idea 2423

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness ]

Full Idea

Moving down the scale from lizards to slugs, there doesn't seem much reason to suppose that phenomenology should wink out while a reasonably complex perceptual psychology persists….and if you move on down to thermostats, where would it wink out?

Gist of Idea

Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish?

Source

David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 3.8.4)

Book Ref

Chalmers,David J.: 'The Conscious Mind' [OUP 1997], p.295

A Reaction

This doesn't seem much of an argument, particularly if its conclusion is that there is phenomenology in thermostats. When day changes into night, where does it 'wink out'? Are we to conclude that night doesn't exist, or that day doesn't exist?

The 18 ideas with the same theme [what causes minds to be conscious]:

23665 Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid]
20118 Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche]
9286 Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James]
7394 Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett]
7890 Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau]
4921 Quantum states in microtubules could bind brain activity to produce consciousness [Penrose]
3141 Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex? [Rey]
4092 The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane]
2386 Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers]
2416 What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers]
2423 Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers]
4916 There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R]
4930 Consciousness arises from high speed interactions between clusters of neurons [Edelman/Tononi]
9312 Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
9313 Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
9315 Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
9316 How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
23516 Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth]