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Full Idea
Opponents typically reply to Searle's argument by conceding that the person in the room does not understand Chinese, and arguing that the understanding should instead be attributed to the system consisting of the person and the pieces of paper.
Gist of Idea
Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't
Source
David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 4.9.4)
Book Ref
Chalmers,David J.: 'The Conscious Mind' [OUP 1997], p.323
A Reaction
Searle himself spotted this reply. It seems plausible to say that a book contains 'understanding', so the translation dictionary may have it. A good Room would cope with surprise questions.
| 2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
| 7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
| 7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
| 5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
| 3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
| 3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
| 3216 | Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker? [Rey] |
| 3220 | Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part [Rey] |
| 2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
| 6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
| 7335 | The Chinese Room should be able to ask itself questions in Mandarin [Westaway] |