more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 2438

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities ]

Full Idea

Semantics, according to the informational view, is mostly about counterfactuals; what counts for the identity of my concepts is not what I do distinguish but what I could distinguish if I cared to (even using instruments and experts).

Gist of Idea

In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions

Source

Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.I)

Book Ref

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'The Elm and the Expert' [MIT 1995], p.37

A Reaction

We all differ in our discriminations (and awareness of expertise), so our concepts would differ, which is bad news for communication (see Idea 223). The view has some plausibility, though.

Related Idea

Idea 223 If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]

The 18 ideas with the same theme [concepts as abilities to believe, decide and reason]:

14792 A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce]
18975 We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James]
12576 Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke]
4157 Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein]
12606 Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein]
10731 For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach]
7613 Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam]
12575 Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]
12614 I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
2471 Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
2472 For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
2438 In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
12626 Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor]
12577 Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
12578 A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
12587 Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
11123 Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence]
11125 The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence]