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Single Idea 2447
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
]
Full Idea
What Hume didn't see was that the causal and representational properties of mental symbols have somehow to be coordinated if the coherence of mental life is to be accounted for.
Gist of Idea
Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'The Elm and the Expert' [MIT 1995], p.85
A Reaction
Certainly the idea that it all somehow becomes magic at the point where the brain represents the world is incoherent - but it is a bit magical. How can the whole of my garden be in my brain? Weird.
The
14 ideas
with the same theme
[mind is the sum of many associations/connections]:
3075
|
Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern?
[Harman]
|
2490
|
Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas'
[Fodor]
|
2447
|
Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind
[Fodor]
|
12624
|
Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role
[Fodor]
|
2991
|
Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought
[Fodor]
|
4998
|
Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths
[Kirk,R]
|
3199
|
Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes
[Rey]
|
3201
|
Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation'
[Rey]
|
3202
|
Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well
[Rey]
|
3200
|
Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism
[Rey]
|
2984
|
Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation
[Lyons]
|
7511
|
Neural networks can generalise their training, e.g. truths about tigers apply mostly to lions
[Pinker]
|
7512
|
There are five types of reasoning that seem beyond connectionist systems
[Pinker, by PG]
|
18562
|
Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes
[Machery]
|