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Single Idea 2450
[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
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Full Idea
Mentalism isn't gratuitous; you need it to explain rationality. Mental causation buys you behaviours that are unlike reflexes in at least three ways: they're autonomous, they're productive, and they're experimental.
Gist of Idea
Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'The Elm and the Expert' [MIT 1995], p.89
A Reaction
He makes his three ways sound all-or-nothing, which is (I believe) the single biggest danger when thinking about the mind. "Either you are conscious, or you are not..."
The
30 ideas
from 'The Elm and the Expert'
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2432
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Is content basically information, fixed externally?
[Fodor]
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2433
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For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning
[Fodor]
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2434
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Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation
[Fodor]
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2435
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Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving
[Fodor]
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2436
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It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth)
[Fodor]
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2438
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In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions
[Fodor]
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2439
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Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences
[Fodor]
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2437
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XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility
[Fodor]
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2440
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Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way
[Fodor]
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2441
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Truth conditions require a broad concept of content
[Fodor]
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2442
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Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world
[Fodor]
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2458
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Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs
[Fodor]
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2446
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Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle
[Fodor]
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2459
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Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is
[Fodor]
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2451
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To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true
[Fodor]
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2463
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A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality
[Fodor]
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2447
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Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind
[Fodor]
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2461
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An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time
[Fodor]
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2457
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If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs
[Fodor]
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2462
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Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs
[Fodor]
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2454
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We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments
[Fodor]
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2455
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Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused
[Fodor]
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2460
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Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean
[Fodor]
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2443
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I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation
[Fodor]
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2453
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We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts
[Fodor]
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2445
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Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again
[Fodor]
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2450
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Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment
[Fodor]
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2452
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Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content
[Fodor]
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2464
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Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds
[Fodor]
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3114
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Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff
[Fodor]
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