more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 2453

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought ]

Full Idea

I think it is likely that we are the only creatures that can think about the contents of our thoughts.

Gist of Idea

We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts

Source

Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4)

Book Ref

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'The Elm and the Expert' [MIT 1995], p.92

A Reaction

I think this is a major idea. If you ask me the traditional question - what is the essential difference between us and other animals? - this is my answer (not language, or reason). We are the metathinkers.

The 16 ideas with the same theme [consciousness as higher levels of thinking]:

5002 Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke]
4086 Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Kant, by Crane]
23190 Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche]
7111 Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre]
4888 It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
2453 We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
7885 The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau]
7886 Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau]
7887 States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau]
7888 Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau]
8895 If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour]
12586 Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
9320 Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick]
9321 Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick]
9322 Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick]
9314 Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]