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Single Idea 2463

[filed under theme 2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason ]

Full Idea

There seems to be an emerging naturalist consensus that is Realist in ontology and epistemology, externalist in semantics, and computationalist in cognitive psychology, which nicely allows us to retain our understanding of ourselves as rational creatures.

Clarification

'Naturalist' - scientific; 'realist' - things exist outside the mind; 'externalist' - meanings aren't private; 'computationalist' - the brain thinks with physical processes

Gist of Idea

A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality

Source

Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4)

Book Ref

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'The Elm and the Expert' [MIT 1995], p.102

The 30 ideas from 'The Elm and the Expert'

2432 Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor]
2433 For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
2434 Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
2435 Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor]
2436 It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
2438 In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
2439 Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
2437 XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
2440 Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor]
2441 Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
2442 Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor]
2458 Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor]
2446 Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor]
2459 Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor]
2451 To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
2463 A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor]
2447 Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor]
2461 An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor]
2457 If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
2462 Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor]
2454 We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor]
2455 Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor]
2460 Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor]
2443 I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor]
2453 We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
2445 Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor]
2450 Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor]
2452 Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor]
2464 Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor]
3114 Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor]