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Single Idea 2465
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
]
Full Idea
Why mightn't fleshing out the standard psychological account of perception itself count as learning what perceptual justification amounts to?
Gist of Idea
Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 1)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'In Critical Condition' [MIT 2000], p.7
The
41 ideas
from 'In a Critical Condition'
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2465
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Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved
[Fodor]
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2467
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Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation
[Fodor]
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2469
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The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains)
[Fodor]
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2468
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Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism
[Fodor]
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2471
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Are concepts best seen as capacities?
[Fodor]
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2473
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Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction
[Fodor]
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2472
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For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something
[Fodor]
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2470
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Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q
[Fodor]
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2474
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It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it
[Fodor]
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2476
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The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories
[Fodor]
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2475
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Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example
[Fodor]
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2477
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If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end?
[Fodor]
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2483
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Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning
[Fodor]
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2485
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Do intentional states explain our behaviour?
[Fodor]
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2481
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Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything
[Fodor]
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2484
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The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work
[Fodor]
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2482
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It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states
[Fodor]
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2480
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Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't
[Fodor]
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2486
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Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content
[Fodor]
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2487
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Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language
[Fodor]
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2490
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Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas'
[Fodor]
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2489
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Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers
[Fodor]
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2491
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Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness
[Fodor]
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2492
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Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience
[Fodor]
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2493
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According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process
[Fodor]
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2494
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Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it
[Fodor]
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2498
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Modules make the world manageable
[Fodor]
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2496
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Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts
[Fodor]
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2495
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Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation
[Fodor]
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2497
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Something must take an overview of the modules
[Fodor]
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2499
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Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do
[Fodor]
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2500
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Babies talk in consistent patterns
[Fodor]
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2502
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How do you count beliefs?
[Fodor]
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2501
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Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images
[Fodor]
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2504
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Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure
[Fodor]
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2507
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Rationality rises above modules
[Fodor]
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2508
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The function of a mind is obvious
[Fodor]
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2503
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Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality
[Fodor]
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2506
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If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them!
[Fodor]
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2509
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Modules have in-built specialist information
[Fodor]
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2505
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Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax)
[Fodor]
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