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Single Idea 2467
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
]
Full Idea
Functionalists claim that pains and the like are higher-order, relational properties that things have in virtue of the pattern of causal interactions that they (can or do) enter into.
Gist of Idea
Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 2)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'In Critical Condition' [MIT 2000], p.13
A Reaction
The whole idea of a property being purely 'relational' strikes me as dubious (or even nonsense). "Is north of" is a relation, but it is totally derived from more basical physical geographical properties.
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[mind is a causal network of functions]:
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2683
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Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body
[Ackrill on Aristotle]
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1718
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Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things?
[Aristotle]
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2588
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Is pain a functional state of a complete organism?
[Putnam]
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2589
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Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions
[Putnam]
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2592
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Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour
[Putnam]
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3461
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Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference
[Searle]
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2324
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Intentionality as function seems possible
[Kim]
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3379
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Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable
[Kim]
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3388
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Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't
[Kim]
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2530
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Could a robot be made conscious just by software?
[Dennett]
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2575
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Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries
[Block]
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2576
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In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations
[Block]
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2583
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You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs
[Block]
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2467
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Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation
[Fodor]
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8131
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Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all
[Burge]
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3186
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If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind?
[Rey]
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3127
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Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research
[Rey]
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6541
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Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic
[Lycan]
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6545
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If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function
[Lycan]
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7027
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Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality
[Heil]
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4759
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Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties
[Engel]
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18419
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Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology
[Cappelen/Dever]
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