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Single Idea 2477
[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
]
Full Idea
If learning that fish typically live in streams is part of learning "fish", typical utterances of "pet fish" (living in bowls) are counterexamples. This argument iterates (e.g "big pet fish"). So learning where they live can't be part of learning "fish".
Gist of Idea
If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end?
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 5)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'In Critical Condition' [MIT 2000], p.57
A Reaction
Using 'typical' twice is rather misleading here. Town folk can learn 'fish' as typically living in bowls. There is no one way to learn a word meaning.
The
41 ideas
from 'In a Critical Condition'
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2465
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Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved
[Fodor]
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2469
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The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains)
[Fodor]
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2467
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Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation
[Fodor]
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2468
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Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism
[Fodor]
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2471
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Are concepts best seen as capacities?
[Fodor]
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2472
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For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something
[Fodor]
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2473
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Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction
[Fodor]
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2470
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Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q
[Fodor]
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2474
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It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it
[Fodor]
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2476
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The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories
[Fodor]
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2475
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Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example
[Fodor]
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2477
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If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end?
[Fodor]
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2485
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Do intentional states explain our behaviour?
[Fodor]
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2484
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The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work
[Fodor]
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2481
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Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything
[Fodor]
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2482
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It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states
[Fodor]
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2483
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Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning
[Fodor]
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2486
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Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content
[Fodor]
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2487
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Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language
[Fodor]
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2480
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Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't
[Fodor]
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|
2490
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Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas'
[Fodor]
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2489
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Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers
[Fodor]
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2491
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Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness
[Fodor]
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2492
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Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience
[Fodor]
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2493
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According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process
[Fodor]
|
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2494
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Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it
[Fodor]
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2499
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Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do
[Fodor]
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2495
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Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation
[Fodor]
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2496
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Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts
[Fodor]
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2498
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Modules make the world manageable
[Fodor]
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2497
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Something must take an overview of the modules
[Fodor]
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2500
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Babies talk in consistent patterns
[Fodor]
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2502
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How do you count beliefs?
[Fodor]
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2501
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Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images
[Fodor]
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2504
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Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure
[Fodor]
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2508
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The function of a mind is obvious
[Fodor]
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2503
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Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality
[Fodor]
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2507
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Rationality rises above modules
[Fodor]
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2506
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If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them!
[Fodor]
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2509
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Modules have in-built specialist information
[Fodor]
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2505
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Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax)
[Fodor]
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