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Single Idea 2480

[filed under theme 18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought ]

Full Idea

Thinking can't just be in sequences of English words since, notoriously, thought needs to be ambiguity-free in ways that mere word sequences are not.

Gist of Idea

Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't

Source

Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6)

Book Ref

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'In Critical Condition' [MIT 2000], p.64

A Reaction

I think this is a strong argument in favour of (at least) propositions. Thoughts are unambiguous, but their expression need not be. Sentences could be expanded to achieve clarity.

The 41 ideas from 'In a Critical Condition'

2465 Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor]
2469 The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor]
2467 Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
2468 Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor]
2472 For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
2470 Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor]
2471 Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
2473 Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor]
2474 It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor]
2475 Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor]
2476 The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor]
2477 If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor]
2484 The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor]
2482 It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor]
2483 Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor]
2485 Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor]
2481 Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor]
2486 Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor]
2480 Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor]
2487 Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor]
2490 Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor]
2489 Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor]
2491 Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor]
2492 Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor]
2493 According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor]
2494 Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor]
2498 Modules make the world manageable [Fodor]
2495 Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor]
2499 Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor]
2496 Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor]
2497 Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor]
2500 Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor]
2502 How do you count beliefs? [Fodor]
2501 Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor]
2506 If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor]
2509 Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor]
2504 Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor]
2505 Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor]
2508 The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor]
2507 Rationality rises above modules [Fodor]
2503 Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor]