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Single Idea 2485
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
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Full Idea
Intentional Realism is the idea that our intentional mental states causally explain our behaviour; so holistic semantics (which says no two people have the same intentional states, or share generalisations) is irrealistic about intentional mental states.
Gist of Idea
Do intentional states explain our behaviour?
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'In Critical Condition' [MIT 2000], p.69
A Reaction
...presumably because two people CAN have the same behaviour. The key question would be whether the intentional states have to be conscious.
The
41 ideas
from 'In a Critical Condition'
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2465
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Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved
[Fodor]
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2467
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Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation
[Fodor]
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2468
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Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism
[Fodor]
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2469
|
The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains)
[Fodor]
|
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2470
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Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q
[Fodor]
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2473
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Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction
[Fodor]
|
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2471
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Are concepts best seen as capacities?
[Fodor]
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2472
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For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something
[Fodor]
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2474
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It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it
[Fodor]
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2475
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Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example
[Fodor]
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2476
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The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories
[Fodor]
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2477
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If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end?
[Fodor]
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2484
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The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work
[Fodor]
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2482
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It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states
[Fodor]
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2485
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Do intentional states explain our behaviour?
[Fodor]
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2486
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Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content
[Fodor]
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2481
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Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything
[Fodor]
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2483
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Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning
[Fodor]
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2487
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Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language
[Fodor]
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2480
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Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't
[Fodor]
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2489
|
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers
[Fodor]
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|
2490
|
Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas'
[Fodor]
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2491
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Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness
[Fodor]
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2492
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Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience
[Fodor]
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2493
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According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process
[Fodor]
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2494
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Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it
[Fodor]
|
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2497
|
Something must take an overview of the modules
[Fodor]
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2495
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Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation
[Fodor]
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2499
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Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do
[Fodor]
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2496
|
Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts
[Fodor]
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2498
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Modules make the world manageable
[Fodor]
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2500
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Babies talk in consistent patterns
[Fodor]
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2501
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Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images
[Fodor]
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2502
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How do you count beliefs?
[Fodor]
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2509
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Modules have in-built specialist information
[Fodor]
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2503
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Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality
[Fodor]
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2506
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If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them!
[Fodor]
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2504
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Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure
[Fodor]
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2507
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Rationality rises above modules
[Fodor]
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2508
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The function of a mind is obvious
[Fodor]
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|
2505
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Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax)
[Fodor]
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