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Single Idea 2489
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
]
Full Idea
Compare Churchland's strategy rooted in neurological modelling with "if it's flight you want to understand, what you need to look at is feathers".
Gist of Idea
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 8)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'In Critical Condition' [MIT 2000], p.84
A Reaction
Sounds good, but may be a false analogy. You learn a lot about snake movement if you examine their scales.
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[mind is a non-reducible physical property]:
5779
|
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws
[Russell]
|
2587
|
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts
[Putnam]
|
3405
|
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
3966
|
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism
[Davidson]
|
3453
|
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism
[Searle]
|
3455
|
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling
[Searle]
|
3456
|
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property
[Searle]
|
3475
|
Property dualism denies reductionism
[Searle]
|
3376
|
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties
[Kim]
|
3424
|
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists
[Kim]
|
2489
|
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers
[Fodor]
|
2985
|
Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"?
[Lyons on Fodor]
|
4070
|
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance
[Crane]
|
2406
|
H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that
[Chalmers]
|
4593
|
'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties
[Heil]
|
6622
|
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain
[Lowe]
|
3520
|
Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical
[Maslin]
|