more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 2502
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
]
Full Idea
There is no agreed way of counting beliefs.
Gist of Idea
How do you count beliefs?
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.16)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'In Critical Condition' [MIT 2000], p.193
The
41 ideas
from 'In a Critical Condition'
2465
|
Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved
[Fodor]
|
2467
|
Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation
[Fodor]
|
2468
|
Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism
[Fodor]
|
2469
|
The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains)
[Fodor]
|
2470
|
Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q
[Fodor]
|
2473
|
Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction
[Fodor]
|
2471
|
Are concepts best seen as capacities?
[Fodor]
|
2472
|
For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something
[Fodor]
|
2474
|
It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it
[Fodor]
|
2475
|
Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example
[Fodor]
|
2476
|
The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories
[Fodor]
|
2477
|
If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end?
[Fodor]
|
2484
|
The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work
[Fodor]
|
2482
|
It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states
[Fodor]
|
2485
|
Do intentional states explain our behaviour?
[Fodor]
|
2486
|
Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content
[Fodor]
|
2481
|
Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything
[Fodor]
|
2483
|
Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning
[Fodor]
|
2487
|
Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language
[Fodor]
|
2480
|
Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't
[Fodor]
|
2489
|
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers
[Fodor]
|
2490
|
Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas'
[Fodor]
|
2491
|
Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness
[Fodor]
|
2492
|
Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience
[Fodor]
|
2493
|
According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process
[Fodor]
|
2494
|
Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it
[Fodor]
|
2497
|
Something must take an overview of the modules
[Fodor]
|
2495
|
Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation
[Fodor]
|
2499
|
Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do
[Fodor]
|
2496
|
Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts
[Fodor]
|
2498
|
Modules make the world manageable
[Fodor]
|
2500
|
Babies talk in consistent patterns
[Fodor]
|
2501
|
Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images
[Fodor]
|
2502
|
How do you count beliefs?
[Fodor]
|
2509
|
Modules have in-built specialist information
[Fodor]
|
2503
|
Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality
[Fodor]
|
2506
|
If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them!
[Fodor]
|
2504
|
Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure
[Fodor]
|
2507
|
Rationality rises above modules
[Fodor]
|
2508
|
The function of a mind is obvious
[Fodor]
|
2505
|
Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax)
[Fodor]
|