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Full Idea
In linguistics there are two schools of thought: Bloomfieldian structuralism (favoured by Quine) conceives of sentences acoustically and meanings behaviouristically; and Chomskian generative grammar (which is silent about semantics).
Gist of Idea
Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it
Source
Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxiv)
Book Ref
Katz,Jerrold J.: 'Realistic Rationalism' [MIT 2000], p.-11
A Reaction
They both appear to be wrong, so there is (or was) something rotten in the state of linguistics. Are the only options for meaning either behaviourist or eliminativist?
| 2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
| 2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
| 2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
| 2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
| 2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
| 2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
| 2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
| 2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
| 2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |