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Full Idea
There is virtually universal acceptance of Frege's definition of sense as the determiner of reference.
Gist of Idea
It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference
Source
Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxvi)
Book Ref
Katz,Jerrold J.: 'Realistic Rationalism' [MIT 2000], p.-9
A Reaction
Not any more, since Kripke and Putnam. It is one thing to say sense determines reference, and quite another to say that this is the definition of sense.
| 2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
| 2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
| 2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
| 2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
| 2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
| 2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
| 2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
| 2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
| 2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |