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Single Idea 2530

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism ]

Full Idea

How could you make a robot conscious? The answer, I think, is to be found in software.

Gist of Idea

Could a robot be made conscious just by software?

Source

Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.6)

Book Ref

Katz,Jerrold J.: 'Realistic Rationalism' [MIT 2000], p.129


A Reaction

This seems to be a commitment to strong AI, though Dennett is keen to point out that brains are the only plausible implementation of such software. Most find his claim baffling.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [mind is a causal network of functions]:

Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle]
Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle]
Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey]
Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey]
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil]
Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel]
Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]