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Full Idea
The link between Aboutness and consciousness, plus the latter's theoretical recalcitrance, have prevented reduction of the former.
Gist of Idea
Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect
Source
Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro)
Book Ref
Sturgeon,Scott: 'Matters of Mind' [Routledge 2000], p.2
A Reaction
I remain unconvinced that Aboutness (intentionality) has to be wholly (or even partly conscious). We are more interested in our conscious mental states, because those are the ones we can report to other people, and discuss.
| 3225 | Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey] |
| 7439 | The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong] |
| 7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
| 4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
| 8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
| 3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
| 6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
| 3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey] |
| 3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
| 7272 | Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve] |