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Full Idea
The link between Aboutness and consciousness, plus the latter's theoretical recalcitrance, have prevented reduction of the former.
Gist of Idea
Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect
Source
Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro)
Book Ref
Sturgeon,Scott: 'Matters of Mind' [Routledge 2000], p.2
A Reaction
I remain unconvinced that Aboutness (intentionality) has to be wholly (or even partly conscious). We are more interested in our conscious mental states, because those are the ones we can report to other people, and discuss.
| 2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
| 2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
| 2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
| 2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
| 2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
| 2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |