more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 2553

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind ]

Full Idea

All that is needed for the mind-body problem to be unintelligible is for us to be nominalist, to refuse firmly to hypostasize individual properties.

Gist of Idea

The mind is a property, or it is baffling

Source

Richard Rorty (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [1980], 1.3)

Book Ref

Rorty,Richard: 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' [Blackwell 1980], p.32


A Reaction

Edelman says the mind is a process rather than a property. It might vanish if the clockspeed was turned right down? Nominalism here sounds like behaviourism or instrumentalism. Would Dennett plead guilty?


The 9 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about the mind]:

Nous is unlimited, self-ruling and pure; it is the finest thing, with great discernment and strength [Anaxagoras]
The Stoics think that soul in the narrow sense is nothing but reason [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body [Spinoza]
Mind is never isolated, but only exists in its interactions [Dewey]
There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty]
I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]
Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel]
The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar]