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Single Idea 2553
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
]
Full Idea
All that is needed for the mind-body problem to be unintelligible is for us to be nominalist, to refuse firmly to hypostasize individual properties.
Gist of Idea
The mind is a property, or it is baffling
Source
Richard Rorty (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [1980], 1.3)
Book Ref
Rorty,Richard: 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' [Blackwell 1980], p.32
A Reaction
Edelman says the mind is a process rather than a property. It might vanish if the clockspeed was turned right down? Nominalism here sounds like behaviourism or instrumentalism. Would Dennett plead guilty?
The
16 ideas
from Richard Rorty
19090
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If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words
[Rorty]
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4726
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Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers
[Rorty, by O'Grady]
|
2549
|
For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality
[Rorty]
|
2548
|
If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social
[Rorty]
|
2550
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Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia
[Rorty]
|
2554
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Is intentionality a special sort of function?
[Rorty]
|
2553
|
The mind is a property, or it is baffling
[Rorty]
|
2556
|
Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts
[Rorty]
|
2557
|
Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one
[Rorty]
|
2558
|
Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society
[Rorty]
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2559
|
Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences
[Rorty]
|
2560
|
Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change?
[Rorty]
|
2562
|
A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states
[Rorty]
|
2565
|
Nature has no preferred way of being represented
[Rorty]
|
2566
|
You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words
[Rorty]
|
6599
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Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations
[Rorty]
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