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Single Idea 2554

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories ]

Full Idea

Following Wittgenstein, we shall treat the intentional as merely a subspecies of the functional.

Gist of Idea

Is intentionality a special sort of function?

Source

Richard Rorty (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [1980], 1.3)

Book Ref

Rorty,Richard: 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' [Blackwell 1980], p.32

A Reaction

Intriguing but obscure. Sounds wrong to me. The intentional refers to the content of thoughts, but function concerns their role. They have roles because they have content, so they can't be the same.

The 16 ideas from Richard Rorty

19090 If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty]
4726 Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady]
2549 For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty]
2548 If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty]
2550 Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty]
2554 Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty]
2553 The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty]
2556 Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty]
2557 Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty]
2558 Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty]
2559 Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty]
2560 Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty]
2562 A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty]
2565 Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
2566 You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty]
6599 Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty]