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Single Idea 2565
[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
]
Full Idea
Nature has no preferred way of being represented.
Gist of Idea
Nature has no preferred way of being represented
Source
Richard Rorty (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [1980], 6.5)
Book Ref
Rorty,Richard: 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' [Blackwell 1980], p.300
A Reaction
Tree rings accidentally represent the passing of the years. If God went back and started again would she or he opt for a 'preferred way'?
The
15 ideas
from 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature'
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4726
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Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers
[Rorty, by O'Grady]
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2549
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For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality
[Rorty]
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2548
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If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social
[Rorty]
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2550
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Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia
[Rorty]
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2554
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Is intentionality a special sort of function?
[Rorty]
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2553
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The mind is a property, or it is baffling
[Rorty]
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2556
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Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts
[Rorty]
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2557
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Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one
[Rorty]
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2558
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Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society
[Rorty]
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2559
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Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences
[Rorty]
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2560
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Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change?
[Rorty]
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2562
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A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states
[Rorty]
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2565
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Nature has no preferred way of being represented
[Rorty]
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2566
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You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words
[Rorty]
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6599
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Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations
[Rorty]
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