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Single Idea 2566

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique ]

Full Idea

The decision about whether to have higher than usual standards for the application of words like "true" or "good" or "red" is, as far as I can see, not a debatable issue.

Gist of Idea

You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words

Source

Richard Rorty (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [1980], 6.6)

Book Ref

Rorty,Richard: 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' [Blackwell 1980], p.311


The 16 ideas from Richard Rorty

If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty]
Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady]
For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty]
If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty]
Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty]
Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty]
The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty]
Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty]
Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty]
Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty]
Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty]
Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty]
A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty]
Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty]
Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty]