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Full Idea
We can't take a statement that two men, whose overt behaviour was not actually different, were in different states of mind as being really a statement that the behaviour of one man would have been different in hypothetical circumstances that never arose.
Gist of Idea
You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens
Source
Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §3)
Book Ref
Geach,Peter: 'Mental Acts: Their content and their objects' [RKP 1971], p.6
A Reaction
This is the whole problem with trying to define the mind as dispositions. The same might be said of properties, since some properties are active, but others are mere potential or disposition. Hence 'process' looks to me the most promising word for mind.
| 2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
| 2567 | You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach] |
| 2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
| 3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
| 3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
| 7435 | Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong] |
| 2574 | Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block] |
| 4992 | In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R] |
| 4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
| 7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |