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Single Idea 2571
[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
]
Full Idea
Tarski says "we may remain naïve realists or idealists, empiricists or metaphysicians… The semantic conception is completely neutral toward all these issues."
Clarification
Tarski was a famous Polish logician (fl. c. 1944). The 'semantic conception' is his theory of truth as a relationship within languages
Gist of Idea
Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics
Source
report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Susan Haack - Philosophy of Logics 7.5
Book Ref
Haack,Susan: 'Philosophy of Logics' [CUP 1980], p.111
The
35 ideas
with the same theme
[significance of formal defintions of linguistic truth]:
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10824
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If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs
[Field,H on Tarski]
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10969
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Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth
[Tarski, by Read]
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17746
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Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics
[Tarski, by Walicki]
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10904
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Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences
[Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
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16303
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Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined
[Tarski, by Halbach]
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19134
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Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages
[Davidson on Tarski]
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16304
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Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction
[Halbach on Tarski]
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2571
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Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics
[Tarski, by Haack]
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10821
|
Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it
[Tarski, by Field,H]
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10822
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A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory
[Field,H on Tarski]
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9012
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Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences
[Quine]
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10841
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The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement
[Strawson,P]
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6264
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In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language
[Putnam]
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6265
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Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept
[Putnam]
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6269
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Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true'
[Putnam]
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2345
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Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation
[Putnam]
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3744
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The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions
[O'Connor]
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3749
|
What does 'true in English' mean?
[O'Connor]
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8166
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Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth
[Dummett]
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19171
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Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means
[Dummett, by Davidson]
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19136
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Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning
[Davidson]
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19139
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Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common
[Davidson]
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19147
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Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language
[Davidson]
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19172
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To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language
[Davidson]
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15327
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Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories
[Kripke, by Horsten]
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15343
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Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models)
[Kripke, by Horsten]
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10017
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Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth
[Hodes]
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10018
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Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language
[Hodes]
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19320
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If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite
[Kirkham]
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14968
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A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate
[Gupta]
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13503
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A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth
[Hart,WD]
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10170
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While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be
[Reck/Price]
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19205
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'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white
[Merricks]
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16337
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Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power
[Halbach]
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19127
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The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative
[Halbach/Leigh]
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