more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 2578
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
]
Full Idea
If pain is a functional state, it cannot be a brain state, because creatures without brains could realise the same Turing machine as creatures with brains.
Gist of Idea
Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain?
Source
Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 70)
Book Ref
'The Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Beakley,B /Ludlow P [MIT 1992], p.70
A Reaction
This strikes me as being a poorly grounded claim. There may be some hypothetical world where brainless creatures implement all our functions, but from here brains look the only plausible option.
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[criticisms of the functionalist theory of mind]:
|
2348
|
Is there just one computational state for each specific belief?
[Putnam]
|
|
2332
|
Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic
[Putnam]
|
|
2071
|
If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology
[Putnam]
|
|
3499
|
Computation presupposes consciousness
[Searle]
|
|
3501
|
If we are computers, who is the user?
[Searle]
|
|
3393
|
How do functional states give rise to mental causation?
[Kim]
|
|
2578
|
Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain?
[Block]
|
|
2585
|
Not just any old functional network will have mental states
[Block]
|
|
2586
|
In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures?
[Block]
|
|
3514
|
Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions
[Papineau]
|
|
7870
|
Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role
[Papineau]
|
|
3206
|
One computer program could either play chess or fight a war
[Rey]
|
|
2418
|
The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside
[Chalmers]
|
|
7062
|
Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation
[Heil]
|
|
4624
|
If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia
[Heil]
|
|
6623
|
Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion
[Lowe]
|
|
6628
|
Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties
[Lowe]
|
|
6629
|
Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies'
[Lowe]
|