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Single Idea 2583
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
]
Full Idea
It is hard to see how to make sense of the analog of color spectrum inversion with respect to non-qualitative states such a beliefs (where they are functionally equivalent but have different beliefs).
Gist of Idea
You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs
Source
Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 81)
Book Ref
'The Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Beakley,B /Ludlow P [MIT 1992], p.81
A Reaction
I would suggest that beliefs can be 'inverted', because there are all sorts of ways to implement a belief, but colour can't be inverted, because that depends on a particular brain state. It makes good sense to me...
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[mind is a causal network of functions]:
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2683
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Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body
[Ackrill on Aristotle]
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1718
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Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things?
[Aristotle]
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2588
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Is pain a functional state of a complete organism?
[Putnam]
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2589
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Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions
[Putnam]
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2592
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Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour
[Putnam]
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3461
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Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference
[Searle]
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2324
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Intentionality as function seems possible
[Kim]
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3379
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Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable
[Kim]
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3388
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Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't
[Kim]
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2530
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Could a robot be made conscious just by software?
[Dennett]
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2575
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Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries
[Block]
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2576
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In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations
[Block]
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2583
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You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs
[Block]
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2467
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Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation
[Fodor]
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8131
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Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all
[Burge]
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3186
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If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind?
[Rey]
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3127
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Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research
[Rey]
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6541
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Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic
[Lycan]
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6545
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If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function
[Lycan]
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7027
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Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality
[Heil]
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4759
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Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties
[Engel]
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18419
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Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology
[Cappelen/Dever]
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