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Single Idea 2586
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
]
Full Idea
In functionalism, it is very hard to see how there could be a single physical characterization of the inputs and outputs of all and only creatures with mentality.
Gist of Idea
In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures?
Source
Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 87)
Book Ref
'The Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Beakley,B /Ludlow P [MIT 1992], p.87
A Reaction
It would be theoretically possible if the only way to achieve mentality was to have a particular pattern of inputs and outputs. I don't think, though, that 'mentality' is an all-or-nothing concept.
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[criticisms of the functionalist theory of mind]:
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2348
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Is there just one computational state for each specific belief?
[Putnam]
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2332
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Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic
[Putnam]
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2071
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If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology
[Putnam]
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3499
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Computation presupposes consciousness
[Searle]
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3501
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If we are computers, who is the user?
[Searle]
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3393
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How do functional states give rise to mental causation?
[Kim]
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2578
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Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain?
[Block]
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2585
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Not just any old functional network will have mental states
[Block]
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2586
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In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures?
[Block]
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3514
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Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions
[Papineau]
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7870
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Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role
[Papineau]
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3206
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One computer program could either play chess or fight a war
[Rey]
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2418
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The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside
[Chalmers]
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7062
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Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation
[Heil]
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4624
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If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia
[Heil]
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6623
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Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion
[Lowe]
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6628
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Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties
[Lowe]
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6629
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Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies'
[Lowe]
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