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Single Idea 2587

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism ]

Full Idea

The concept of temperature is not the same as the concept of mean molecular kinetic energy. But temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy.

Clarification

Their reference is the same, but their meaning is different

Gist of Idea

Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts

Source

Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.52)

Book Ref

'The Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Beakley,B /Ludlow P [MIT 1992], p.52


A Reaction

This is the standard analogy for mind-brain identity, and it seems fair enough to me. The mind is the activity of the brain. It is rather unhelpful to think of weather in terms of chemistry, but it is actions of chemicals.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [mind is a non-reducible physical property]:

There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim]
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim]
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor]
Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor]
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane]
H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers]
'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil]
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin]