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Single Idea 2588

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism ]

Full Idea

I propose the hypothesis that pain, or the state of being in pain, is a functional state of a whole organism.

Gist of Idea

Is pain a functional state of a complete organism?

Source

Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.54)

Book Ref

'The Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Beakley,B /Ludlow P [MIT 1992], p.54


A Reaction

This sounds wrong right from the start. Pain hurts. The fact that it leads to avoidance behaviour etc. seems much more like a by-product of pain than its essence.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [mind is a causal network of functions]:

Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle]
Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle]
Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey]
Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey]
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil]
Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel]
Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]