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Single Idea 2589

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism ]

Full Idea

The functional-state hypothesis is not incompatible with dualism, as a system consisting of a body and a soul could meet the required conditions.

Gist of Idea

Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions

Source

Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.55)

Book Ref

'The Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Beakley,B /Ludlow P [MIT 1992], p.55


A Reaction

He doesn't really believe this, of course. This claim led to all the weak objections to functionalism involving silly implementations of minds. A brain is the only plausible way to implement our mental functions.


The 8 ideas from 'The Nature of Mental States'

Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]