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Full Idea
The avoidance of epiphenomenalism requires making it plausible that intentional properties can meet sufficient conditions for causal responsibility.
Gist of Idea
Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.154)
Book Ref
'The Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Beakley,B /Ludlow P [MIT 1992], p.154
A Reaction
A wordy way of saying we either have epiphenomenalism, or the mind had better do something - and a good theory will show how. The biggest problem of the mind may not be Chalmer's Hard Question (qualia), but how thought-contents cause things.
| 3157 | T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey] |
| 3154 | Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley] |
| 20374 | Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche] |
| 14494 | Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S] |
| 3398 | Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S] |
| 3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
| 4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
| 7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
| 2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
| 7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
| 7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
| 4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
| 6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |