more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
The avoidance of epiphenomenalism requires making it plausible that intentional properties can meet sufficient conditions for causal responsibility.
Gist of Idea
Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.154)
Book Ref
'The Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Beakley,B /Ludlow P [MIT 1992], p.154
A Reaction
A wordy way of saying we either have epiphenomenalism, or the mind had better do something - and a good theory will show how. The biggest problem of the mind may not be Chalmer's Hard Question (qualia), but how thought-contents cause things.
| 2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
| 2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
| 2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |