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Single Idea 2604

[filed under theme 18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought ]

Full Idea

I am denying that one can learn a language whose expressive power is greater than that of a language that one already knows.

Gist of Idea

We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language

Source

Jerry A. Fodor (How there could be a private language [1975], p.389)

Book Ref

'The Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Beakley,B /Ludlow P [MIT 1992], p.389


A Reaction

I presume someone who had a native language of limited vocabulary could learn a new language with a vast vocabulary. I can increase my expressive power with a specialist vocabulary (e.g. legal).


The 19 ideas with the same theme [brains have an in-built private language ('Mentalese')]:

If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam]
No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam]
Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman]
Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett]
The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett]
Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor]
Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor]
Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor]
Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin]
Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor]
We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language [Fodor]
Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor]
Animals may also use a language of thought [Rey]
We train children in truth, not in grammar [Rey]
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
Information-processing views of the brain assume the existence of 'information', and dubious brain codes [Edelman/Tononi]
Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence]
The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne]