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Single Idea 2605
[filed under theme 18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
]
Full Idea
Fodor concludes that every predicate that a brain could learn to use must have a translation into the computer language of that brain. So no "new" concepts can be acquired: all concepts are innate!
Gist of Idea
If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate!
Source
Hilary Putnam (What is innate and why [1980], p.407)
Book Ref
'The Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Beakley,B /Ludlow P [MIT 1992], p.407
A Reaction
Some misunderstanding, surely? No one could be so daft as to think that everyone has an innate idea of an iPod. More basic innate building blocks for thought are quite plausible.
The
19 ideas
with the same theme
[brains have an in-built private language ('Mentalese')]:
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2605
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If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate!
[Putnam]
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2606
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No machine language can express generalisations
[Putnam]
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3086
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Are there any meanings apart from in a language?
[Harman]
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3996
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Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought
[Lewis]
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2524
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A language of thought doesn't explain content
[Dennett]
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4874
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The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas
[Dennett]
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2480
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Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't
[Fodor]
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2487
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Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language
[Fodor]
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2483
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Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning
[Fodor]
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8090
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Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form
[Fodor, by Devlin]
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12643
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Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English
[Fodor]
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2604
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We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language
[Fodor]
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3010
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Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese
[Fodor]
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3213
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Animals may also use a language of thought
[Rey]
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3170
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We train children in truth, not in grammar
[Rey]
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7715
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Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication
[Lowe]
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4927
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Information-processing views of the brain assume the existence of 'information', and dubious brain codes
[Edelman/Tononi]
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11121
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Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices
[Margolis/Laurence]
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17767
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The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought
[Bayne]
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