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Single Idea 2608

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time ]

Full Idea

McTaggart says we can speak of events in time in two ways, as past, present or future, or as being before or after or simultaneous with one another. The first cannot be reduced to the second, as the second makes no provision for the passage of time.

Gist of Idea

For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events

Source

report of J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927], II.329-) by A.J. Ayer - The Central Questions of Philosophy 1.D

Book Ref

Ayer,A.J.: 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' [Penguin 1976], p.15


The 10 ideas from 'The Nature of Existence vol.2'

How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe]
The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle]
A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe]
Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart]
There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart]
For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer]
The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]