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Full Idea
Our talk of propositions should not be regarded as anything more than a concise way of talking about equivalent sentences.
Clarification
Propositions are said to be the thought behind sentence
Gist of Idea
Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences
Source
A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], IX.C)
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' [Penguin 1976], p.208
A Reaction
Wrong, though I can see why he says it. We struggle to express difficult propositions by offering several similar (but not equivalent) sentences. What is the criterion for deciding his 'equivalence'?
| 5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
| 5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
| 5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
| 5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
| 5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
| 5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
| 5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
| 5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
| 5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
| 2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
| 16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
| 2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |