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Single Idea 2620
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
]
Full Idea
The official theory of mind (as private, non-spatial, outside physical laws) I call 'the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'. I hope to prove it entirely false, and show that it is one big mistake, namely a 'category mistake'.
Gist of Idea
Dualism is a category mistake
Source
Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949], I (2))
Book Ref
Ryle,Gilbert: 'The Concept of Mind' [Penguin 1949], p.17
A Reaction
This is the essence of Ryle's eliminitavist behaviourism. Personally I agree that the idea of a separate 'ghost' running the machine is utterly implausible, but it isn't a 'category mistake'. The mind clearly exists, but the confusion is about what it is.
The
26 ideas
from Gilbert Ryle
13989
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There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way
[Ryle]
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13977
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When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind
[Ryle]
|
13976
|
'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous
[Ryle]
|
13981
|
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion
[Ryle]
|
13980
|
If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment?
[Ryle]
|
13978
|
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic
[Ryle]
|
13979
|
Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding....
[Ryle]
|
13985
|
A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all.
[Ryle]
|
13984
|
Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show
[Ryle]
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13983
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Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two
[Ryle]
|
13982
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If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones
[Ryle]
|
13987
|
We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French
[Ryle]
|
13988
|
Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated
[Ryle]
|
18004
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We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories
[Ryle]
|
2388
|
Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs
[Chalmers on Ryle]
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3354
|
You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real
[Benardete,JA on Ryle]
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2387
|
How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour?
[Chalmers on Ryle]
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18005
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Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories
[Ryle]
|
1354
|
We cannot introspect states of anger or panic
[Ryle]
|
1353
|
Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you
[Ryle]
|
2620
|
Dualism is a category mistake
[Ryle]
|
2622
|
Can one movement have a mental and physical cause?
[Ryle]
|
14297
|
A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition
[Ryle]
|
14300
|
No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency
[Ryle]
|
2624
|
I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think
[Ryle]
|
10800
|
The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions
[Ryle, by Quine]
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