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Single Idea 2683

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism ]

Full Idea

In 'De Anima' Aristotle cannot fit his account of separable reason - which is not the form of a body - into his general theory that the soul is the form of the body.

Gist of Idea

Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body

Source

comment on Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by J.L. Ackrill - Aristotle on Eudaimonia p.33

Book Ref

'Essays on Aristotle's Ethics', ed/tr. Rorty,Amélie Oksenberg [University of California 1980], p.33

A Reaction

A penetrating observation. Possibly the biggest challenge for a modern physicalist is to give a reductive account of 'pure' reason, in terms of brain events or brain functions.

The 22 ideas with the same theme [mind is a causal network of functions]:

2683 Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle]
1718 Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle]
2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
3461 Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
2324 Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
3379 Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
3388 Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
2530 Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
2575 Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
2576 In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
2583 You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
2467 Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
8131 Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
3186 If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey]
3127 Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey]
6541 Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
6545 If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
7027 Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil]
4759 Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel]
18419 Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]