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Full Idea
There are convictions which are common to most societies; but there are others which are not, and no way is given by intuitionists of telling which are the authoritative data.
Gist of Idea
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones?
Source
Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.454)
Book Ref
'A Companion to Ethics', ed/tr. Singer,Peter [Blackwell 1993], p.454
A Reaction
It seems unfair on intuitionists to say they haven't given a way to evaluate such things, given that they have offered intuition. The issue is what exactly they mean by 'intuition'.
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |