more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
Emotivists concluded too hastily that because naturalism and intuitionism are false, you cannot reason about moral questions, because they assumed that the only questions you can reason about are factual ones.
Gist of Idea
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons
Source
Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.455)
Book Ref
'A Companion to Ethics', ed/tr. Singer,Peter [Blackwell 1993], p.455
A Reaction
Personally I have a naturalistic view of ethics (based on successful functioning, as indicated by Aristotle), so not my prob. Why can't we reason about expressive emotions? We reason about art.
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |