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Full Idea
Prescriptivists claim that there are rules of reasoning which govern non-descriptive as well as descriptive speech acts. The standard example is possible logical inconsistency between contradictory prescriptions.
Gist of Idea
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved
Source
Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.455)
Book Ref
'A Companion to Ethics', ed/tr. Singer,Peter [Blackwell 1993], p.455
A Reaction
The example doesn't seem very good. Inconsistency can appear in any area of thought, but that isn't enough to infer full 'rules of reasoning'. I could desire two incompatible crazy things.
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |